01 UNTRUSTED INPUT An instruction hidden in a document or email steers the agent. | Content labeled as data, sender-address authorization, citation verification; containment by allow-list and approvals. What an agent reads is handed to the model as data, not instructions. Email triggers authorize on the sender's address, never the display name. Every citation is checked against the stored page or dropped. We don't rely on the labeling: the allow-list and approvals contain what gets through. In the product | Injection test cases and results. | ATLAS M0030 partialOWASP ASI01/06AI RMF MEASURE |
02 IDENTITY An agent's access turns into standing privilege. | Owner-bound agent identity, RBAC, tenant isolation, encrypted credentials. An agent acts as the person or organization that owns it, never a shared platform identity. Role-based permissions, per-tenant storage, credentials encrypted with AES-256-GCM. In the product | Role matrix, delegation model, tenant-isolation test results, offboarding procedure. | ATLAS M0026SP 800-207SOC 2 CC6 |
03 UNEVALUATED CHANGE An agent's model, instructions or connected apps change and nobody checks. | Automated checks on every code change, versioned agents with rollback, labeled-set evaluations, post-run quality checks. Every code change runs through automated checks: tests, type and style checks, a scan for leaked secrets and a review of third-party packages. Each agent's instructions and model are saved as versions, so you can roll back to an earlier one. Our document-reading pipelines are measured against hand-labeled examples with fixed pass marks, and finished agent runs are checked for quality afterwards. On request | Evaluation report for your workflow, version history, rollback criteria. | AI RMF MEASURECSF ID.IMSOC 2 CC3/CC7 |
04 DATA + SUPPLY CHAIN Your data crosses providers you can't see. | GCP home, named providers by purpose, no training, public list. Platform, agents and stored data in Google Cloud. Model calls go to named providers, none of which train on your data. Public list, notice before it changes. In the product | DPA Annex 3, data-flow diagram, processing locations, retention schedule. | CSF GV.SCSOC 2 CC9 |
05 TOOL MISUSE A legitimate tool becomes the attack path. | Explicit allow-list and scoped reach, one-click revoke. Every agent runs against an explicit allow-list: only the tools its task needs, revocable in one click. In the product | Tool-policy export, blocked-call sample, scope-change history, revoke demonstration. | ATLAS M0028OWASP ASI02CSF PR.AASOC 2 CC6 |
06 CONSEQUENTIAL ACTIONS A plausible answer gets trusted too fast. | Configurable per-action approval gates. Approval can be required on every action. The card shows the exact call and its arguments. An approver can still be fooled, which is why approvals sit behind the allow-list, not in place of it. Residual risk: a person can approve the wrong thing. In the product | Approval policy, sample approval record, approver identity, timeout behavior. | ATLAS M0029OWASP ASI09 residualSOC 2 CC6/CC7 |
07 INVISIBLE ACTION The agent acts and nobody can say why. | Tool, sub-agent, message and approval logs, exportable. Tool calls, sub-agent calls, messages and approvals are logged. Inspect and export the audit log. In the product | Sample export, retention policy, actor and timestamp fields. | ATLAS M0024CSF DE.CMSOC 2 CC7 |
08 DRIFT + INCIDENTS Detection arrives, authority stays live. | Fleet health on the dashboard, post-run scoring, one-click revoke, 72-hour incident notice. Failed runs, stuck runs and broken connectors surface on the agents dashboard. Completed runs are scored after the fact, and a reflection pass proposes fixes when quality slips. One-click revoke. Incident notice within 72 hours of confirmation, written into the DPA. In the product | Revoke demonstration, incident runbook, recovery test. | CSF DE/RS/RCSOC 2 CC7 |